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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
TORTS-LEAVING KEYS IN IGNITION HELD
NOT ACTIONABLE NEGLIGENCE
Plaintiff brought an action to recover for damages to her parked auto-
mobile which resulted from an automobile thief's negligent driving of
defendant's vehicle. The defendant parked his car on a main thoroughfare
and turned off the motor, but neglected to remove the keys from the
ignition. During his absence the automobile was stolen. The thief, in the
process of taking it, negligently collided with plaintiff's parked vehicle.
The plaintiff alleged that the damages to her automobile were proximately
caused by the defendant's negligence in violating a Missouri statute mak-
ing it unlawful to leave the key in the ignition of an unattended automo-
bile, but which also provided that such an act shall have no bearing in any
civil action.' In addition, the plaintiff alleged a breach of a common law
duty to the plaintiff without regard to the defendant's violation of the
statute. The trial court sustained defendant's motion for judgment, from
which plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed on the grounds
that a violation of the statute, in view of its broad exclusionary language,
did not constitute negligence per se. Also, it held that the plaintiff failed
to disclose a duty on the defendant's part to discover the presence of
thieves in the vicinity where he parked his car, thereby failing as a matter
of law to adduce sufficient evidence of negligence or of proximate cause
to make a submissible case of common law negligence. Garver v. Lamb,
282 S.W. 2d 867 (Mo., 1955).
Where an action is brought under a legislative enactment, such as the
statute in the instant case, the applicability of the civil remedy provisions
of the statute may be questioned and liability under the statute may be
contested either on the basis of the absence of any negligence, or the want
of any causal connection between the violative conduct and the injury.
Each point presents distinct problems within its own restricted sphere,
requiring separate analysis, inasmuch as the latter point introduces for
consideration all of the elements involved in a common law action of neg-
ligence, namely, duty, breach, causation and injury.
The court's conclusion as to statutory negligence based on the de-
1 "No person shall leave a motor vehicle unattended on the highway without first
stopping the motor and cutting off the electric current, and no person shall leave
a motor vehicle . . . unattended . . . unless the mechanism, starting device or igni-
tion of such motor vehicle shall be locked. The failure to lock such motor vehicle
shall not mitigate the offense of stealing the same, nor shall such failure be used to
defeat a recovery in any civil action for the theft of such motor vehicle, or the in-
surance thereon, or have any other bearing in any civil action." Mo. Rev. Star. (1949)
sec. 304.150; Emphasis added.
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fedant's violation of the Missouri statute was determined by its concep-
tion of the legislative intent: that a violation thereof should not affect
civil liability "or have any other bearing in any civil action. ' 2 Such broad
exclusionary language distinguishes this statute from similar ones adopted
in a number of other states, where the problem has arisen as to whether
the violation of a criminal statute which does not provide for civil liability
should, of itself, constitute negligence in a civil action. Civil liability may
extend to the violation of-such a criminal statute where the plaintiff is one
of the class of persons whom the statute was designed to protect, and the
injury was the kind the statute was designed to prevent.A
Although the almost universal American and English attitude requires
that the statutory prescription as to a standard of conduct at least be con-
sidered in determining civil rights and liabilities, the courts are virtually
in complete disagreement on the effect to be given such a statute. Two
firmly entrenched attitudes are, however, clearly reflected. The majority
of the jurisdictions hold that an unexcused violation of such a statute is
negligence per se, i.e., negligence as a matter of law.4 An articulate
minority considers such a statutory violation only as evidence of negli-
gence to be weighed by the jury.5 The majority finds justification for its
position on the rationale that the legislature has, by forbidding certain
acts, made absolute the standard of care required. Thus, any violation of
the statute is deemed to be inconsistent with the minimum degree of care
which the legislature established." The minority, on the other hand,
theorizes that the legislature, in enacting a criminal statute for the purpose
of preserving the peace or of protecting life and limb, does not intend to
2 Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) sec. 304.150. See Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal. 2d 60, 271
P. 2d 23 (1954), where similar treatment was accorded a municipal ordinance in Cali-
fornia containing the same exclusionary language.
a Prosser, Torts 152 (1955); Rest., Torts Sec. 430 (1949).
4R. W. Claxton, Inc. v. Schaff, 169 F. 2d 303 (D.C. Cir., 1948), cert. denied 335
U.S. 871 (1948); Barsch v. Hammond, 110 Colo. 441, 135 P. 2d 519 (1943); Larkins v.
Kohlmeyer, 229 Ind. 391, 98 N.E. 2d 896 (1951); Pryor's Adm'r v. Otter, 268 Ky. 602,
105 S.W. 2d 564 (1937); Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814 (1920); Schell
v. Du Bois, 94 Ohio St. 93, 113 N.E. 664 (1916); Buddenberg v. Morgan, 110 Ind.
App. 609, 38 N.E. 2d 287 (1942); Tooke v. Muslow Oil Co., 183 So. 97 (La. App.,
1938).
G Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School Dist., 29 Cal. 2d 581, 177 P. 2d 279 (1947);
Nadeau v. Perkins, 135 Me. 215, 193 A. 877 (1937); Anderson v. Robbins Incubator
Co., 143 Neb. 40, 8 N.W. 2d 446 (1943); Costanza v. Cavanaugh, 131 N.J.L. 175, 35 A.
2d 612 (1944); Landry v Hubert, 101 Vt. 111, 141 A. 593 (1928).
6 Authorities cited note 5 supra. See also Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action,
27 Harv. L. Rev. 317 (1914), in particular, and, in addition, Harper, A Treatise on
the Law of Torts § 78 (1933); Morris, Criminal Statutes and Tort Liability, 46 Harv.
L. Rev. 453 (1933).
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change the ordinary common law duty to use due care under the circum-
stances.
7
Either theory, in dogmatic and rigorous application, produces untenable
results which has elicited harsh criticism from respected legal commenta-
tors." Professor Morris, having written extensively on the subject, suggests
that the best solution to the conflict is to take the most desirable features
of each position, i.e., allow the court, in cases where it decides that the
legislative standard is the correct one, to take it as being determinative;
and, where the court is uncertain that the legislative standard is proper
as the criterion for negligence, it should be permitted to state that the
standard required is due care under the circumstances and that the viola-
tion of the statute may be considered as evidence of negligence in deter-
mining the issue."
Once it has been determined, however, that a given injury falls outside
the scope of the statute, any civil action based solely on the statute must
necessarily fail, although it by no means necessarily follows that the
action cannot be sustained on some other basis (for example, common law
negligence) or that the statutory standard must be regarded as entirely
irrelevant. In recognizing this, the court in the instant case, having dis-
posed of the statutory question, considered the allegation of common law
negligence. Relying on Zuber v. Clarkson Construction Co.10 because of
the unique factual situation presented in the instant case, the court con-
cluded as a matter of law that the defendant was neither negligent, inas-
much as he was under no duty to discover thieves in the vicinity where
he parked his car, nor was his act the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injury."
An injured plaintiff, to recover from the owner of an automobile left
unattended in the street and negligently driven by a third person in the
owner's absence without his permission, must show (1) that the owner
was negligent under the circumstances in leaving the car unattended, 12
7 Authorities cited note 6 supra. Also, Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal
Negligence, 16 Minn. L. Rev. 361 (1932).
8 Cf., e.g., Fleming, 11 La. L. Rev. 95, 105, where the author characterizes the Massa-
chusetts doctrine of treating an unregistered motor vehicle as a trespasser on the high-
way as "a barbarous relic of the worst there was in puritanism."
0 The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49 Col. L. Rev. 21 (1949).
10 363 Mo. 352, 251 S.V. 2d 52 (1952).
11 Emphasis added.
12Ross v. Hartmann, 139 F. 2d 14 (D.C. Cir., 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 790
(1943); Richards v Stanley, 43 Cal. 2d 60, 271 P. 2d 23 (1954); Touris v. Brewster &
Co., 235 N.Y. 226, 139 N.E. 249 (1923); 38 Am. Jur., Negligence sec. 72 (1936).
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and (2) that such negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injury.13
The question of the owner's negligence in such situations is usually
considered to be one of fact for the determination of the jury in the light
of all the circumstances. 14 Circumstances requiring that the court declare
as a matter of law that the defendant was not negligent are not, however,
unknown.15 Notwithstanding his negligence, however determined, the
owner may still avoid liability if his act is not deemed the proximate
cause of the resultant injury, as where the thief's interposition is held to
be an intervening efficient cause interrupting the chain of causation.16
This too has been held to be either a question of fact within the province
of the jury17 or a question of law to be decided by the court.'8 Irrespec-
tive of the manner in which both issues are resolved, a decision favorable
to the defendant is ultimately reached in the vast majority of cases, usual-
ly on the basis that the theft of the defendant's car was an intervening act
which negatives his negligence. This is true though both acts were neces-
sary for the damage to accrue, since the second cause could not reason-
ably have been foreseen by the defendant.19
To resolve an apparent conflict on the appellate level,20 the Illinois
Supreme Court in Ney v. Yellow Cab Company2' has clarified the Illinois
13 E.g., Katz v. Helbing, 215 Cal. 449, 10 P. 2d 1001 (1932). It should be noted that
the dangerous instrumentality doctrine is inapplicable, for an automobile is not inher-
ently dangerous. Roberts v. Lundy, 301 Mich. 726, 4 N.W. 2d 74 (1942).
14Tierney v. N.Y. Dugan Bros., 288 N.Y. 16,41 N.E. 2d 161 (1942).
15 See, e.g., Tabary v. New Orleans Pub. Service Co., 142 So. 800 (La. App., 1932);
Touris v. Brewster & Co., 235 N.Y. 226, 139 N.E. 249 (1923).
16 Howard v. Swagart, 161 F. 2d 651 (D.C. Cir., 1947); Schaff v. R. W. Claxton,
Inc., 79 App. D.C. 207, 144 F. 2d 532 (1944); Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 111. 2d 74, 117
N.E. 2d 74 (1954); Castay v. Katz and Besthoff, 148 So. 76 (La. App., 1933).
17 Schaff v. R. W. Claxton, Inc., 79 App. D.C. 207, 144 F. 2d 532 (1944); Ney v.
Yellow Cab Co., 2 Ill. 2d 74, 117 N.E. 2d 74 (1954); Garis v. Eberling, 18 Tenn.
App. 1, 71 S.W. 2d 215 (1934).
18 Howard v. Swagart, 161 F. 2d 651 (D.C. Cir., 1947); Curtis v. Jacobson, 142 Me.
351, 54 A. 2d 520 (Maine, 1947); Williams v. Greene, 181 Va. 707, 26 S.E. 2d 89 (1943);
Castay v. Katz and Besthoff, 148 So. 76 (La. App., 1933); Walter v. Bond, 267 App.
Div. 779, 45 N.Y.S. 2d 378 (1943).
19Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal. 2d 60, 271 P. 2d 23 (1954); Galbraith v. Levin, 323
Mass. 255, 81 N.E. 2d 560 (1948); Curtis v. Jacobson, 142 Me. 351, 54 A. 2d 520 (1947);
Walter v. Bond, 267 App. Div. 779, 45 N.Y.S. 2d 378 (1943). Contra: R. W. Claxton,
Inc. v. Schaff, 169 F. 2d 303 (D.C. Cir., 1948), cert. denied 335 U.S. 871 (1948); Red
v. Vaniska, Inc., 14 N.J. Super. 94, 81 A. 2d 377 (1951); Kiste v. Red Cab, Inc., 122
Ind. App. 587, 106 N.E. 2d 395 (1952); Midkiff v. Watkins, 52 So. 2d 573 (La. App.,
1951).
20 Compare Ostergood v. Frisch, 333 111. App. 359, 77 N.E. 2d 537 (1948), with
Cockrell v. Sullivan, 344 Ill. App. 620, 101 N.E. 2d 878 (1951).
212 Ill. 2d 74, 117 N.E. 2d 74 (1954).
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position with respect to the numerous problems relating to civil liability
arising generally from the violation of a statute, and those relating specifi-
cally to a statute similar to the one litigated in the instant case.22 The
court concluded, in affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, that the entire
section viewed as a whole, was a public safety measure, the violation of
which under the prevailing rule in the state being prima facie evidence of
negligence. However, this, in itself, creates no liability because the injury
must have a "direct and proximate" connection with the violation of the
statute-to be determined by a jury-before liability will be imposed. It
appears that this decision places Illinois among the minority of jurisdic-
tions having adjudicated the question.
In conclusion, it is submitted that imposing civil liability upon the auto-
mobile owner, whether by virtue of his violation of an applicable statute
or by common law negligence, is somewhat incongruous in light of the
recognized principle of agency that when an automobile is used by one to
whom it was loaned, for the borrower's purposes, the lender is not liable
unless, possibly, where the lender knew that the borrower was incom-
petent and that injury might occur because of his incompetency.23 Such
civil liability as is imposed leads to the interesting result that if someone
takes the owner's car with his permission, the owner escapes liability; if
someone takes it without his permission in his absence, the owner is
liable.
WILLS-PAROL EVIDENCE ADMITTED TO SHOW WILL
NOT REVOKED BY SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE
A few days prior to executing his will, testator proposed marriage to a
Mrs. Allison. Married when the proposal was made, Mrs. Allison left for
Reno, Nevada, where she was granted a divorce, marrying testator the day
the decree was granted and returning with him to Illinois where they
lived until his death in 1953. Reversing an order of the County Court
refusing probate to the will on the ground that it was revoked by testa-
tor's marriage, the Circuit Court held that the divorce decree was void for
want of jurisdiction, that testator's marriage was of no effect, and that
the will was therefore not revoked. Testator's son, who received one-
fourth of the estate, appealed to the Supreme Court of Illinois, where it
was held that while the marriage was valid, it did not revoke the will.1
22111. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 952, § 189; note, however, that this section does not have
the exclusionary language found in the Missouri statute.
23Weatherman v. Ramsey, 207 N.C. 270, 176 S.E. 568 (1934).
1 In holding testator's marriage valid, the court rejected the contention that Mrs.
Allison's divorce was null and void because of a lack of jurisdiction on the part of
the Nevada court. It was held that the fact that Mrs. Allison's former husband was
